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War Policy,
Public Support,
and the Media
WILLIAM M. DARLEY

P

erhaps no element of the current conflict in Iraq engenders more emotion
and acrimony within the military than debate concerning the role and influence of the news media on public opinion and national policy. Debates regarding this subject are nothing new. Since at least the Civil War, anecdotal
assertions associated with media influence on American wars have caused
controversy among government officials, members of the military, scholars,
pundits, and members of the press as they continue to argue the media’s effects. Historically, contention over the issue of media influence has become
particularly acute when the policies of the administration executing the conflict are perceived as being either too slow, or failing, to achieve their political
objectives at the cost of mounting casualties.
Under such circumstances, critics of the press have been predictable
in accusing the media of editorial bias that undermines public support for military operations, while most reporters have been equally predictable in countering that they are just faithfully reporting what they observe. This subject
probably received its most severe examination and critique in the aftermath of
the Vietnam War, when media influence over public opinion and policy became the subject of dozens of commissions, scholarly workshops, conferences, and countless research papers and books.1 Among the first, most
notable, and most influential of the many post-mortem works was Peter
Braestrup’s meticulously documented book, The Big Story, an examination of
the linkages and relationships of political decisionmaking as influenced by media reporting during and immediately after North Vietnam’s Tet Offensive in
1968.2 So traumatic was this train of exhaustive examinations that the question
of media bias and its influence on policy and public opinion during the Vietnam
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War continues to surface as a fixed point of comparison almost immediately
whenever the United States has become involved in subsequent conflicts. This
contentious disagreement is again evident in current comparisons of the press
coverage of Iraq with that of Vietnam, kindling new debates regarding the influence of the media over public opinion and policy.
As a result of this reemerging debate, it is useful and appropriate to revisit the relationship of press reporting, public opinion, and war policy, and to
seek a theoretical understanding of how these relate to each other. A good point
of departure is to examine the conclusions that many social scientists reached
concerning the relationship of the media and war policy during the Vietnam War.

Vietnam and Subsequent Conflicts
The assertion that biased media coverage was the decisive factor in
turning domestic US public opinion against the war in Vietnam has been
closely analyzed and convincingly challenged by a large number of distinguished and disinterested researchers. Among the most respected studies were
those conducted by Daniel Hallin and Clarence Wyatt, who, after analyzing the
effect of so-called negative media images of the war on the American people,
found virtually no evidence to support any causal relationship between editorial tone and bias in the media with loss of public support for the war.3
Additionally, in perhaps the most widely quoted study of the relationship between public opinion and news reporting from Vietnam—one regarded
by many as the seminal work on the subject—Ohio State University professor
John Mueller compared and analyzed the effects of the media on public opinion during the Korean and Vietnam conflicts. He “found that support for the
wars among the general public followed a pattern for decline that was remarkably similar,” even though the media were neither as pervasive nor as critical
during the Korean conflict as they were during the Vietnam War.4 He summed
up his conclusions as follows:
Many have seen Vietnam as a “television war” and argue that the vivid and
largely uncensored day-by-day television coverage of the war and its brutalities made a profound impression on public attitudes. The poll data used in this
study do not support such a conclusion. They clearly show that whatever impact television had, it was not enough to reduce support for the war below the
levels attained by the Korean War, when television was in its infancy, until casualty levels had far surpassed those of the earlier war.5

Moreover, Mueller found in his study evidence of a recurring tendency in public responses to national conflicts that flatly contradicts the notion of media domination of policy formulation through the biases of editorial
tone in reporting. He called this tendency the “rally round the flag” phenome122
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non.6 Other researchers have noted this phenomenon as well, expressing consternation over an observable recurring dynamic of public opinion that does
not respond in accordance with models that posit a predictable loss of public
support based solely on “rational” responses to untoward policies or events in
war. For example, public opinion researcher Nelson W. Polsby wrote, “Invariably, the popular response to a President during [an] international crisis is
favorable, regardless of the wisdom of the policies [the President] pursues.”7
Commenting on Polsby’s observation, researcher Richard Brody added,
“This counterintuitive movement of public attitudes—backing the President
when his policies may have been unwise or even unsuccessful—is what intrigues public opinion researchers. When things go badly, or the outcome is
unclear, the public’s positive response needs to be accounted for.”8
A notable example of this “rally round the flag” phenomenon over a
fairly sustained period of time was observed in British public opinion polling
during the Thatcher government’s handling of the Falkland Islands War. At
the onset of the crisis, the British public mood and press comment toward the
government for its preparedness and handling of the initial stages of the
Falklands confrontation was highly critical. However, as the crisis unfolded,
and as the Thatcher government took decisive steps to retake the islands from
Argentina by armed intervention, the level of public support in Great Britain
steadily grew—from 44 percent approving military action to reassert control
over the Falklands in early April 1982 to more than 80 percent in late May
1982.9 An article published in Public Opinion summarized what was to some
researchers a perplexing shift in public support:
[By the time] of the landing and as British losses mounted, some observers expected public support to begin to dwindle. In fact, the opposite occurred. By
that time the Sheffield had been lost, Sea King helicopters had been ditched,
Harriers had been lost, the HMS Antelope was sinking and scores of lives lost,
but 80 percent of those polled thought on the 23d of May that the government
was right to go ahead with the landing on the Falklands.10

In a later study, Mueller observed the same pattern recurring in the
ebb and flow of public opinion related to Operation Desert Storm. In the
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months immediately following Iraq’s 1990 invasion of Kuwait, the public approval rating for then-President George H. W. Bush’s handling of the war declined from 76 percent approval in August 1990 to 54 percent in October
1990. This decline was widely interpreted, even by those in the White House,
as a reflection of public dissatisfaction with a growing perception of seemingly ineffectual policies in response to Saddam Hussein’s continued occupation of Kuwait. However, public support began to climb somewhat as the
United States began transparent preparations for possible military intervention, bolstered by the President’s ultimatum to Iraq on 8 November that military force would be used if Saddam Hussein’s regime did not abandon
Kuwait. And, upon initiation of the air campaign on 16 January 1991, there
was what can be fairly described as leap in public support registered in polls
and continuing throughout the conflict.11 As Mueller notes,
War galvanized public attention, and support soared for the war and for the President. And this seems to have led to a sort of boosterism within the media. . . .
Those thinking we had made a mistake sending troops to Saudi Arabia dropped
13 percentage points, those approving Bush’s handling of the Persian Gulf situation rose 19 points, those approving his handling of Iraq’s invasion of Kuwait
rose 24 points, those approving the way he was handling the Iraq situation rose
28 points, those approving the job he was doing as President rose 18 points, those
trusting him to make the right decision on war went up 20 points. . . . These indices generally remained high throughout the war, and Bush’s popularity took another bolt upward—to a phenomenal 89 percent [through March 1991].12

Public opinion researchers Michael Duffy and Dan Goodgame assert that this jump in public support was directly attributed to the manner in
which the President “encountered public resistance at half a dozen turns in the
crisis and overcame it, not with soaring rhetoric, but with bold actions, each
of which shifted public opinion toward support of his policy.”13
After analyzing media influence on war policy during Desert Storm,
Mueller went on to note,
The role of the media in influencing thought is often considered to be enormous. Most research on this issue, however, concludes that, in the main, media
reports simply reinforce or strengthen beliefs already held by their readers and
viewers. . . . Moreover, once Bush launched the war, the public (and Congress
and the media) were catapulted into cheering, uncritical support that resembled
bloodlust to some horrified observers.14

The same pattern of public support rising in correlation with demonstrations of decisive military action has been observable over time during Operation Iraqi Freedom. In the early phases, the Gallup Poll recorded a dramatic jump
in domestic US approval for the President’s handling of the war in Iraq, rising
124
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from 55 percent in December 2002 to 76 percent approval in April 2003, correlating with the highly visible and successful combat operations specifically directed at the overthrow of Saddam Hussein’s Ba’athist regime.15 Subsequently,
popular support for both the President and the war steeply declined as events in
Iraq settled into a pattern of what many in the public apparently regarded as inertia and stagnation, reaching its nadir in June 2004 with 51 percent disapproval in
both an ABC News/Washington Post survey and a CBS News/New York Times
survey and 49 percent disapproval in a Gallup Poll for roughly the same period.
However, following similar “rally round the flag” patterns observed in conjunction with events in previous conflicts, public confidence in the President as reflected in all major polls had a modest but significant uptick in apparent
correlation to bold military actions associated with counterinsurgency operations in Fallujah from September through November 2004, as well as after positive events stemming from determined coalition support of Iraq’s elections and
the resulting Iraqi voter turnout. This was registered in a 52 percent approval rating in the ABC News/Washington Post survey in January 2005 and a 57 percent
approval rating as recorded by a Gallup Poll in early February 2005. The CBS
News/New York Times survey recorded a 49 percent approval for roughly the
same time period, up from 42 percent in June 2004.16
The same “rally round the flag” phenomenon has been evident in other
instances of US military expeditionary intervention. Polling reflected broad and
intense public support for relatively short-lived military actions during the
Mayaguez incident and the invasion of Grenada, even though both were executed on extremely short notice without “preparation” of the so-called “public
information battlefield” beforehand.17 In addition, both were characterized by
notable operational shortfalls and errors, including resulting casualties, and
were treated with considerable disdain in some highly visible press reporting. In
contrast, public opinion dropped in response to the government’s handling of the
seizure of the Pueblo in 1968 and to the taking of American hostages in Iran in
1979—especially in the aftermath of the aborted Desert One hostage rescue operation—both of which also resulted in loss of materiel or life.18
How does one account for a rise in public support for some military
actions even in the face of losses and mistakes, and a decline in public support
for others experiencing similar shortcomings, with both types of crises being
subject to all manner of critical news coverage?

The Surprising Insights of Clausewitz
For an understanding of this phenomenon, certain strands within
Clausewitz’s theory of war as developed in his seminal work On War seem to
account for the observed “counterintuitive” and “irrational” behavior noted
by Mueller and others. Though Clausewitz was writing well before the modSummer 2005
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ern theories and vocabulary of public opinion polling and public relations, he
described certain elements within the category of what he called “moral
forces” that we would today identify as closely resembling factors of human
nature associated with the modern concept of public opinion.19 Moreover, in
laying the groundwork for his theory, he took pains to exhort strategists contemplating the use of military force to recognize the dominant influence that
such moral forces have on the conduct of a war, making it incumbent on them
to properly stimulate and shape these forces to establish the political conditions for success.20 He wrote,
The moral elements are among the most important in war. They constitute the
spirit that permeates war as a whole, and at an early stage they establish a close
affinity with the will that moves and leads the whole mass of force. . . . The effects of physical and psychological factors form an organic whole, which, unlike a metal alloy, is inseparable by chemical processes. In formulating any rule
concerning physical factors, the theorist must bear in mind the part that moral
factors may play in it. . . . Hence most of the matters dealt with in this book are
composed in equal parts of physical and of moral causes and effects. One might
say that the physical seem little more than the wooden hilt, while the moral factors are the precious metal, the real weapon, the finely-honed blade.21

These moral forces included what Clausewitz described as a natural
“primordial hatred and enmity” resident in the people toward those perceived
as enemies.22 He describes this instinctive animus as characterized by latent
“hostile intention” manifest in an “impulse to destroy the enemy.”23 The character of these elements in response to perceived enemies within the family of
moral forces logically implies that public support for wars is not so much an
act of intellectual deliberation as it is a collective emotional reaction to events
due to what Clausewitz elsewhere described as a latent “hatred and enmity,
which are to be regarded as a blind natural force.”24
Consequently, what we today describe as public opinion regarding a
war would be properly understood not as a rational action, but primarily as a
noncognitive passion guided by an instinctive faith that a population invests
in the intellectual judgment and wisdom of trusted political leaders. Consequently, Clausewitz’s theory implies that the naturally occurring animus for
an enemy would be primarily stimulated and conditioned by the character of
political policy as reflected primarily in its manner of execution.25 Moreover,
the intensity and focus of public opinion would mirror the character of national policy itself: “If war is part of policy, policy will determine its character. As policy becomes ambitious and vigorous, so will war. . . . It can be taken
as agreed that the aim of policy is to unify and reconcile all aspects of internal
administration as well as of spiritual values.”26
126
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Conversely, Clausewitz warned, if policy were weak, the moral
forces of the state would then mirror its weakness, resulting in dissipation of
the irrational element of enmity resident in the people, which would in turn be
reflected in weak or declining public support for the conflict.27
So policy converts the overwhelming destructive element of war into a mere instrument. It changes the terrible battle-sword that a man needs both his hands
and his entire strength to wield, and with which he strikes home once and no
more, into a light, handy rapier—sometimes just a foil for exchange of thrusts,
feints, and parries.28
Money and other resources are usually running short and his moral impulse is
not sufficient for a greater effort. In such a case he does the best he can; he hopes
that the outlook will improve although he may have no ground for such hopes.
Meanwhile, the war drags slowly on, like a faint and starving man. Thus interaction, the effort to outdo the enemy, the violent and compulsive course of war,
all stagnate for lack of real incentive.29

These Clausewitzian assertions with regard to the relationship of policy and morale appear to provide insight and explain with surprising precision
the differences observed among the various conflicts and crises as previously
noted by public opinion researchers. Scrutiny of real-world events largely appears to validate what many scholars have found and what Clausewitz’s assertions regarding the correlation of policy versus the prevailing character of moral
forces seem to predict. This accounts for a stronger correlation between the degree of strength and resolve of leadership in defining war policy as reflected in
successful military operations mirrored in public opinion than correlation with
other influences such as the critical tone or editorial bias of press reports. As
noted by Brody, “In the aggregate, the public seems to respond to policy outcomes, not to the means of achieving them; the response is pragmatic rather than
ideological.”30 In other words, public opinion is more responsive to actual battlefield results than to the ideological words promulgated to the public through
whatever medium. Clausewitz expresses this specific relationship as follows:
Trophies apart, there is no accurate measure of loss of morale; hence in many cases
the abandonment of the fight remains the only authentic proof of victory. . . . This
shame and humiliation, which must be distinguished from all other psychological
consequences of the transformation of the balance, is an essential part of victory. It
is the only element that affects public opinion outside the army, that impresses the
people and the governments of the two belligerents and their allies.31

Revisiting the Vietnam Experience
Bearing the above in mind, and revisiting the salient and muchdebated issue of media influence on policy in Vietnam as a possible tool for asSummer 2005
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sessing the current effects of the media on policy concerning Iraq, clearly public
support and media tone have a complicated and correlated relationship. But, as
noted previously, an enormous amount of research has produced little credible
evidence to establish a causal relationship between so-called bias or slanting of
media coverage and public opinion concerning the war. When pondering this
important question and establishing intellectual perspective, one should perhaps
first ask oneself to consider how long the people of any nation can be expected to
maintain popular support for a conflict that lasts 12 years, is bankrupting their
country, causing spiral inflation with resulting domestic hardships, costing large
numbers of casualties, and which has obviously stagnated and is failing to
achieve policy objectives—irrespective of a sniping media tone or slant.
William Hammond, regarded by many as the premier authority on
military and media relations during the Vietnam War, also concluded that there
was little evidence to support a causal relationship between the tone of editorial
reporting and the general public opinion. However, he does suggest that there
was evidence to support a causal relationship between the factual content of information communicated through the media and shifts in public opinion, often
in ways critics of the media might not expect. For example, he notes the following with regard to public opinion polls taken during and immediately following
the Tet Offensive in January 1968, widely and wrongly asserted by many to
have been a decisive turning point marking the final irrevocable downturn in
public support for continuation of the war:
Whatever the pessimism of the press, however, the majority of Americans went
their own way. Queried by the Gallup Poll on whether they considered the war a
mistake, 45 percent responded “yes,” the same percentage as in December
1965; 43 percent said “no,” a drop of 3 points; and 12 percent had no opinion.
Even more telling, the number of those who considered themselves “hawks” on
the war rose 4 percentage points between December and February, while those
who saw themselves as “doves” fell by the same percentage. The number of
those expressing confidence in the government’s military policies in South
Vietnam rose from 61 to 74 percent. Queried by Louis Harris on whether a
bombing halt would hasten the chances for peace, 71 percent of respondents favored continuing the bombing, a rise of 8 points over the previous October,
while the number of those favoring a halt fell from 26 to 18 percent.32

Thus, if Hammond’s interpretation of polling is a correct analysis of
US domestic public opinion through the first part of 1968, the factual content
of media reports, in most cases accompanied by editorial content opposing
the war, evoked in a significant segment of the US public a desire for
more—not less—aggressive and decisive action to finish the war on terms favorable to the United States. Hammond goes on to note the following:
128
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If Americans were unwilling to repudiate the war, they nonetheless appeared
increasingly dissatisfied with their President. Willing to back any decision he
made, they saw little forward motion on his part. . . . The air of indecision that
hung about his policies as a result took a toll on his standing in the polls, where
disapproval of his handling of the war rose from 47 to 63 percent by the end of
February. . . . If the gloomy reporting of the press had little effect on American
public opinion, it nonetheless reinforced doubts already circulating within the
Johnson Administration.33

Apparently, though the editorial tone of media coverage did not have
an immediate significant effect on domestic US groups already divided in
their opinions regarding the war, it did appear to have what proved to be a decisive effect on President Lyndon B. Johnson himself. Consequently, it is
worth highlighting that the moral center of the plurality supporting continuation of the war (either at the same level of commitment or through escalation)
appears to have held more or less firm somewhat beyond the Tet Offensive.
But this moral center appears to have given way when President Johnson, the
policy figure who had led the country in the war and was therefore the moral
center of gravity in maintaining support for continuing the war, announced in
one televised flourish that he would not run for the presidency, would order a
halt to the strategic bombing of the north, and would spend the balance of his
remaining time in office trying to negotiate an “honorable” peace. When the
man who led the war gave it up, American war policy was apparently converted in the eyes of many from the terrible sword of war to the “light rapier”
in the manner described by Clausewitz, resulting in a loss of faith and an irrevocable, permanent downturn in support for the war among elements that
were formerly holding firm.
In search of additional empirical evidence to explain or account for
the complex trends in public support for the war in Vietnam, the RAND Corporation sponsored two studies to examine the relationship of casualties to
political policy under circumstances of armed conflict. These included examination of the possible impact of the news media. In the first study, published
in 1994, RAND researcher Bernard Schwarz asserted that he had found evidence that seemed to support the presence of the kind of instinctive animus
described by Clausewitz among the American public during the Vietnam
War, implying that conventional wisdom concerning the nature of public
opinion during that conflict has been habitually wrong. He concluded that the
evidence regarding the nature of public support for the war had been consistently misinterpreted, and that until quite late in the conflict, setbacks in the
war did not make the majority of American people responding to surveys
more “dovish” and less supportive of the objectives and sacrifices of the war,
only less supportive of the perceived lack of boldness in the policies governSummer 2005
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ing the way the war was being waged. In addition to polling data, Schwarz
used indirect evidence from a highly respected analysis published earlier in
the American Political Science Review, which he summarized as follows:
Much anti-war sentiment, in fact, reflected disillusionment with the war and
the concomitant desire not to withdraw troops but instead to escalate the war to
get it over on terms favorable to the United States. This explains a curious and
overlooked fact. In the 1968 New Hampshire primary, the dovish anti-war candidate Senator Eugene McCarthy polled a surprisingly high 42 percent of the
vote against President Johnson, convincing the President that his popular support had so eroded that reelection was impossible. McCarthy’s strong performance was widely interpreted at the time as pro-peace vote. . . . But among
McCarthy voters, those who were dissatisfied with Johnson for not pursuing a
harder line in Vietnam outnumbered those who wanted a withdrawal by a margin of 3 to 2. . . . [By November] a plurality [of those who had voted for McCarthy] . . . switched to the hardline candidate Governor George Wallace.34

Because Schwarz’s atypical conclusions generated significant interest among public opinion researchers and policy leaders, RAND commissioned a second study, published in 1996, by Eric V. Larson to examine in much
greater depth the relationship of casualties to political decisions during armed
conflict. After a more exhaustive examination of contemporary polling data
collected during the Vietnam War, Larson concluded that the existing empirical evidence could not substantiate Schwarz’s conclusions that casualties and
setbacks had increased public support for an escalation of the conflict—
though Larson did assert that there was evidence of hardened support for gradual disengagement under circumstances favorable to the United States.35 As a
result, RAND formally withdrew the first report and substituted the Larson report as its officially authorized study on the subject. In a summary of his conclusions, Larson wrote:
At the extremes, some have argued that casualties and declining support have
led to increasing demands for immediate withdrawal, while others (e.g.,
Schwarz, 1994) have argued that casualties and declining support have led to
inexorable demands for escalation to victory. The data appear to contradict
both extreme views, while being broadly consistent with other past RAND
work and work by other scholars that demonstrates the importance of leadership and objective events and conditions in the level of the public’s commitment to an ongoing military operation.36
One of the most important findings of this study is the central role of leadership—and divisions among leaders—in support for military operations and
preferences regarding strategy and the level of commitment. Many public opinion analyses tend to ignore leadership or to treat it simplistically as presidential
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manipulation of public opinion or a search to find justifications that will resonate with the public. . . . Substantial evidence supports the proposition that
leadership consensus or dissensus is an essential element in the character of
public support for US military interventions.37

As can be noted, Larson asserted that analysis of the existing empirical evidence pointed to two dominant factors evoking support as expressed in
public opinion polling: the strength and character of political leadership, and
the outcome of actual “objective” events resulting from political decisions—
two of the prime factors also highlighted by Clausewitz as key elements shaping the character of a war.
Possible evidence illustrating the relationship of these two factors
surfaces again even late in the Vietnam War, when overall trends in public disapproval of the war were virtually irreversible after years of conflict that had
exhausted and demoralized the American public. Indications of policy stimulating the instinctive animus resident in the people noted by Clausewitz
appear evident in the dramatic, albeit short-lived, positive shift in public support that occurred in apparent reaction to the Cambodian incursion of 1970,
aimed at attacking Vietnamese regulars in cross-border sanctuaries. This
brief but significant shift occurred even as general public support was ebbing
and at the height of editorial opposition to the war in the media.38 As Larson
observed, “I find ample—and compelling—empirical support in the narrow
issue area of US military operations for the importance of opinion leadership
and much weaker evidence supporting the case for a bottom-up process.”39
This “bottom-up process” might reasonably include editorial comments or a
perceived slant in news reporting.

What Really Influences Public Opinion?
Obviously the technological means both to wage war and to communicate news about wars have dramatically changed since Clausewitz’s time.
Close examination of modern practical experience, however, seems to validate that public support is better explained by Clausewitz’s theory as a mirrored response to the nature of war policy and actual events, rather than by
modern hypotheses asserting either a calculated cost-benefit analysis on the
part of the public focused on casualties, or the dominant effects of editorial
tone or slant in news coverage. Nevertheless, in sounding the depth and
strength of such instinctive animus toward an enemy, one very significant lesson from the Vietnam experience should be especially clear: this wellspring
of animus in the people described by Clausewitz is not inexhaustible, and is
only partly renewable as a conflict continues. This is suggested in the absence
of a public opinion bounce in support for Nixon’s incursion into Laos in 1971,
Summer 2005
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also noted by Hammond, signaling the American people had reached a state
of emotional culmination for supporting the war and would no longer respond
to the stimulus of bold, aggressive policy in Vietnam.40
In summary, as intimated by Clausewitz, the most important factor
in tapping and shaping the “blind hatred” for an enemy that underpins public
support for a conflict is aggressive, decisive national policy as reflected in
bold actions to achieve clear, specific political and military objectives. Conversely, the absence of such focused and bold policy appears to be the primary
factor that dissipates the resolve and focus of the people’s “moral forces.” It is
also useful to note that such aggressive policy increasing the commitment of a
people’s moral forces to the cause would include policy measures to demand
participation and sacrifice from citizens on the home front in building the
“battle sword” of overwhelming force, as well as to fund and produce the robust logistical support systems that are required in the execution of grand national policy to achieve military objectives.
Therefore, assuming the validity of these observations and this interpretation of Clausewitz’s theory, one is led to conclude that the best “information
operations” campaign aimed at engendering domestic psychological support as
well as demoralizing and defeating adversaries is an aggressive policy reflected
in bold battlefield operations and commensurate administrative supporting actions to achieve clear and specific political and military objectives.
This discussion is not intended to ignore or discount the influence of
detractors in the media—especially in the global media age—who willfully
misreport with the intent of undermining war policy and sowing doubt in the
domestic populace. Intuitively one recognizes in such media reports a corrosive effect on national morale and public support for a war that is difficult to
measure or counter. However, this analysis offers a theoretical perspective to
suggest that between the two competing factors of press and policy, by far
policy—as manifest by bold leadership and action—has the greater influence
on public opinion. This conclusion suggests that modern communications
technology has not made adversarial media more persuasive in dampening
the primeval instinctive animus resident in human nature, but it has made
such voices—which are now more numerous and louder—more potentially
distracting for the public, policymakers, and those who execute policy
through action. As Larson additionally observed,
Although the media may not have the impact on the substantive policy preferences
of the public that some impute to it, technological and other advances could have a
profound effect on democratic governance. Perhaps the most important effects
would be a perception among policy makers that the electronic media are shortening their decision cycles and the increasing availability of “flash” polling that often reflects little more than ephemeral and transitory opinion.41
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The collective national challenge is for wartime policymakers to understand
that the nature of perception generated by the immediacy of the media is
“ephemeral and transitory,” and that the most important long-term factor shaping public support is a focus on formulating and resourcing clear, bold policy
that the military can translate into decisive action without getting distracted.
Moreover, when boldness, clarity of objectives, and effectiveness of
policy are reflected in deeds in accordance with the implications of Clausewitz’s theory, the nature of the ruthlessly competitive modern media system
ensures that the press will report that clarity and resolve to the public as the
factual content of its news coverage. The news media remain the principal
messengers of bold policy to the public, and they will report it purely as a consequence of relentless marketplace competition, irrespective of whatever baggage of bias some quarters of the media establishment may attach to it. As a
consequence, assuming the correctness of the policy in its articulation and the
boldness of its execution, domestic public support will take care of itself. To reflect on Clausewitz once more:
In short, at the highest level the art of war turns into policy—but a policy conducted by fighting battles rather than by sending diplomatic notes. . . . No major
proposal required for war can be worked out in ignorance of political factors; and
when people talk . . . about harmful political influence on the management of
war, they are not really saying what they mean. Their quarrel should be with the
policy itself, not with its influence. If the policy is right—that is, successful—
any intentional effect it has on the conduct of the war can only be to the good. If it
has the opposite effect, the policy itself is wrong.42
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